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1. THE MAIN RESULTS 
Consider a differential game associated with a system of m differential 
equations 
dxjdt = f(t, x, Y, 4 (to < t < To), (1.1) 
an initial condition 
x(fo) = x0 w 
and a payoff 
P(Y, 4 = /” h(t, $3 Y, 4 dt. (1.3) 
Here the control functions y(t), z(t) c h osen by the players y, z are measurable 
functions with values in compact subsets Y, Z of some euclidean (or metric) 
spaces. The time t” is the capture time of the curve (t, x(t)) with respect to 
a given closed terminal set F in the (t, x)-space, and 
FI[T,, 03) x R”. 
The reader is referred to [5] for the general theory of differential games 
(with more general payoffs). Here we consider only the case of generalized 
pursuit-evasion games, i.e., the case where h(t, x, y, Z) > 0. The player y  
(called the evader) tries to maximize the payoff, and the player x (called the 
pursuer) tries to minimize the payoff. 
We shall assume: 
(AI) f(t, x, y, Z) is continuous in [t, , T] x RR” x Y x 2, and 
x * f(t, x, y, x) < h(t)(l x I2 + l), 
s 
?i(t) dt < co. 
to 
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(A,) For any R > 0, if 1 x 1 < R, 1% 1 < R then 
(As) h(t, X, y, .z) is continuous in [ts , TO] x Rm x Y x Z and 
h(t, x, y, x> 3 0. 
(AJ The Isaacs condition holds 
(1.4) 
foranypERW,tO<t<TO,xERm. 
(AS) For any t, < t < T,, , x E Rm, the set 
is convex. 
Introduce a variable x,+~ and define 
for any triple (y(s), z(s), X(S)) satisfying (1.1) and (1.2) [y(s), x(s) are control 
functions]. Let 
and define 
P(x’) = qy, 27) = Xm+#>. (14 
Note that this payoff is the same as the payoff (1.3). Further, 5 is equal to 
the capture time of (t, x’(t)) with respect to the terminal set F’. However, 
instead of working with the system (1 . l)-(1.3) and the terminal set F, we shall 
work with the system (l.l), (1.Q (1.2), (1.6) and the terminal set F’. The 
latter is more convenient since the payoff (1.6) is terminal and therefore the 
concept of generalized payoff set P,[d , T’], with respect to (1. l), (1 S), (1.2), 
(1.6), is defined [5; p. 241. 
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DEFINITION. The extended upper and lower values, V,+ and V,-, for the 
differential game associated with (1 .l)-(1.3) and F are the numbers 
V,+ = inf sup P,[d, 71, 
A I- 
V,- = sup inf P,[d, r]; 
I A 
here P,[A, r] is the generalized payoff set defined with respect to (1. l), (1.5), 
(1.2), (1.6). The condition (As) ensures that the set P&l, J’j is nonempty. 
Clearly V,+ 3 V,-. I f  V,+ = V,-, we say that the extended value exists; 
the number V, = V,+ = V,- is then called the extended value. From 
[5, Section 3.11 and [l, 61 it follows that the extended value exists if (AI)- 
hold and h = 1. The main result of the present paper is the following: 
THEOREM 1. If (Ai)- hold then the extended value exists. 
Recently Elliott and Kalton [2] h ave introduced a different notion of 
extended value W, and proved that if (AJ-o-() hold, and if also (i) h(t, x, y, a) 
is Lipschitz continuous in x, and (ii) the Isaacs condition (1.4) holds for both 
the pair (f, h) and the pair (f, --h), then W, exists. As a by-product of the 
proof of Theorem 1 we shall derive the following result: 
THEOREM 2. If (AJ-(AJ hold then W, exists, and if (Ai)- hold then 
v, = we. 
2. PROOF OF THEOREMS 1, 2 
Without loss of generality we may assume that f (t, x, y, s) = 0 
h(t, x, y, .z) = 1 if 1 x 1 is sufficiently large, since changing f and h for all 
1 x 1 large does not affect the extended value. We may also assume that 
F contains all the points (t, x), t, < t ,( T,, , with 1 x 1 sufficiently large. 
We first prove Theorem 1 under the additional assumption that 
h(t, x, Y, 4 3 ho > 0 (h, constant). (2.1) 
For any E > 0, consider the payoff 
Q&‘) = Q&J, z) = inf(p(t, x(t); xmtl(t> < E, to < t < ToI, (2.2) 
where p(t, X) is the distance from (t, x) to F. The following lemma was proved 
by Elliott and Kalton [2]: 
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LEMMA 2.1. If {AZ)-(As) and (2.1) hoZd then f&(x’) is un$ormly contaitzcaus 
on the space X, o” T o of al,! t~~ject~~es (JS), (l.S), (1.2) c~~~e~ its a subset of 
the quick space? [C(t, , To)]m+x ( f 0 con ~~~0~ (~2 + I)-sectors ~tk the st4p t 
nom). 
~~~~k. If the monition (AJ holds with respect to both (f, &) and 
(ft -h) then, by [l, Section IO] or [6, end of Section l], it follows that the 
game kth payoff QE has value. The main effort in the proof of Theorem I 
is aimed at deriving the last assertion under the mere condition (A&); this is 
the content of Lemma 2.4. Note that Lemma 2.1 is a consequence of 
Lemma 2.2 (which is proved i~deFendent~y of Lemma 2.1). 
Let n be any positive integer, and let 
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Now, for any y  > 0, if ta < t < ti+r , then 
provided t,,, - ti = 6 is sufficiently small; this follows from the equi- 
continuity of the trajectories of (l.l), (1.2). Combinkg this fact with (2.4), 
(2.9, the assertion of the lemma follows. 
Denote by V*(Ms), V*(&) the upper and lower values of the games 
corresponding to the payoffs ME and QE, respectively. From Lemma 2.2 
we then obtain 
LEMMA 2.3. Let (AJ-(As) and (2.1) hold. If V+(ME) = V-(ME) for any 
n, then V-yQJ) = V-p&). 
We now come to the crucial lemma: 
LEMMA 2.4. If(Ar)-(A4) and (2.1) hold then, for any n, V+(M,) = V-(IV,). 
Proof. For clarity, suppose first that n = 1. If  f, h are uniformly Lipschitz 
continuous in (t, x) then, by [6], Y+(Ms) is the limit of W,+(t,, , x, , 0) 
(as E I 0) where 
w,+(T 4 = mW& , 4x&), dTo , x)xdxm+d on t=T,,, 
W,+(t, x’) is bounded in t,, < t ,( T,, . 
Notice that WE+(TO , x’) = WE+(T,, , x, x%+~) is a monotone nondecreasing 
function of xm+r . Now, for any p > 0, W<+(t, x, x,+1 + p) and W,+(t, x, xmtl) 
can be obtained as limits of solutions Us+ and Us- (R -+ CO) of initial- 
boundary value problems with the same parabolic equation as in (2.6), with 
U,+ = JKVci > x, xm+l + p), U,- = W,+(T, , x, xm+J on t = To, I x’ I < R, 
and with U,+ > Us- on ( x’ / = R, t, < t ,< TO . By a standard comparison 
theorem [3, p. 421 we conclude that U,+ 2 U,- if 1 x’ 1 < R, to < t < TO . 
Hence, K+(t, x, x,, + EL) 2 K+(t, x, x,+J, i.e., 
(w%&t,> w,+p, $9 %+l) 3 0. (2.7) 
Similarly Y-(&2,) = lim,, WE-(t, , x0 , 0), where 
WG-(t, x’) is bounded in to < t < To , 
Hence, by (2.7), we can change the order of “min max” in (2.6) into 
“max min.” Consequently, WE+ is a solution of the Cauchy problem (2.8). 
By uniqueness, W$ E We-. Taking E -+ 0, we get the assertion V+(M,) = 
-we& 
Having proved that ~~(~~~ = ~-(~~~ in case f, h are uniformly Lipschitz 
continuous in (t, x), we can now prove the same assertion for genera1 f, 
h by approximation. This requires an estimate as in Theorem 2 of [G]. The 
details are similar to those in [6, proof of Corollary] or [I, Section S], and 
are therefore omitted. 
We have proved Lemma 2.4 in the special case n = 1. Consider now the 
general case. We shall proceed by induction on the number of points ti I 
First we need a lemma of general nature. 
Let g$(x’) (0 < i < n) be Lipschitz continuous functions and introduce 
three payoffs: 
where Vz+(x’(tlc)) is the upper value of the game associated with the payoff 
P2 . Denote by VI+ and V,C the upper values ~o~espondi~g to the payoffs PI 
and Pa respectively. 
LEMMA 2.5. I (AI)- hoZd then VI+ = V,+. 
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Proof. We shall use notation and results from [S, Section 2.11. Denote 
by l& , l& any partitions of [t ,-, , tk] and [tk , t,], respectively. Denote by 
Vpnz the upper (I7; , IQ-value corresponding to PI . Then 
VFD2 = inf su 
I? 
inf sup min{g, , g, ,..., g,>, 
Anlr 1 A172r=z 
where gi stands for g&c’(t,)). Using the relation 
min(g, ,..., gn) = mWmin[g, ,..., gk-,I, mink ,..., gJ> 
and noting that min[g, ,..., g&J is independent of An2 , Fs, we get 
VFn2 = inf sup min(min[g, ,..., g,-,I, inf sup min[g, ,,.., gn]}. 
Aq l-=1 AII,i+? 
The second term in min{ , } is equal to 
inf sup P,[A, , rG] = VP. 
An2 1-2 
Hence 
Vpa = inf s2 min{g, ,..., g,-, , VP). 
An1 r 2 
For any E > 0, if 1 I& 1 is sufficiently small, say 1 l7a 1 < yr , then 
) VP - vz+ 1 < E; 
this estimate is valid uniformly with respect to the initial condition (trc , X’(Q) 
(as follows from the results of [5, Section 2.21). Hence 
pw2 - 
1 - inf sup min(g, ,..., g,-, , V,+) + BE, IO 1 < 1. (2.10) 
Next, if 1 L$ 1 < 3/2 , j 17, / < 3/2 for suitably small yz , then (by [5, Sec- 
tion 2.21). 
] inf sup min(g, ,..., 
An; r, 
&+I , V,‘) - v,+ I < % 
I vF=g - Vlf I < E. 
Using these inequalities in (2.10), the assertion of the lemma follows. 
We can now complete the proof of Lemma 2.4. Our reductive ~s~ptio~ 
is that for the payofI 
and the initial condition (tlC, x’(&J), the upper and lower values, 
V~~~~; tk , x’(&J) and Y-(N1;,; t, , cc’(&)) are equal, and their common value 
I~~~~; tk , ~‘~~~)) is monotone nondecreasing in x~+~ . 
Applying Lemma 2.5 with 
and using the inductive assumption, we conclude that V+(&; q+l , x’(t&~) 
is the upper value for the game with payoff 
and initial condition (teV1 , ~‘(~~-~), played on the time interval [&-x f tk]; 
further, the function V(MB; t& , xl) is monotone no~de~re~i~ in x,,, I 
A similar assertion is true for lJ-(ME; t,, , x’(&+)) with the same payoff 
(2.11). 
We can now apply the argument given above for n = 1 (with 4, C& 
replaced by Q+% , tk) to conclude that 
and that ~i~~~~; &+a, x’) is monotone nondecreasing in x~++~ . ~~i~~ 
completed the inductive proof, we note that the assertion (2.12) for k = I 
yields the assertion of Lennna 2.4. 
From Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, we conchxde: 
LEMMA 2.5. If ~A~)-~A~} and (2.1) J25dokk t&z V+(QE) = V-(Q& 
The value V(&) = V+@J is a nonincreasing function of E, and V@&) = 0 
if E is s~ciently large. In pro~ng Theorem 1 we may assume that 
p(q) f x0> > 0. using (2.1) we conclude that V($&) > 0 if E is saliency 
small. It foilows that 
is a positive number. We claim 
v,+ = E”, v*- = E”, (2.14) 
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The proof is similar to the proof in case lz z 1 [5, 71. For any E > 0, 
VQE) = 0 for some E < E* + E. 
Since the value V(Qx) exists, and since QE(x’) is a continuous functional, there 
exists [5, Chap. 21 a generalized saddle point (A*, I’*), i.e., 
for all d, r, where QEo[d, q is the generalized payoff set corresponding to 
the payoff QE . It follows that 
QEo[A *, I’] = 0 for all r. 
But this implies that for any trajectory (x(t), ~~+i(t)) in the generalized 
outcome of (Li*, r), ~~+~(f) < E, i.e., 
Po[A*) r] < E. 
This implies that V,+ < E < E* + E. Since E is arbitrary, V,+ < E”. 
Similarly, for any E > 0 there is an E > E* - E for which V(QE) > 0. 
If (A **, I’**) is a generalized saddle point for this game, then 
QEO[A, TX*] Z V(Qd > 0 
for all A. This implies that P,[A, I’**] > E > E* - E. It follows that 
V,- > E*, and the proof of (2.14) is complete. 
The assertion of Theorem 1, in case (2.1) holds, is a consequence of (2.14). 
Consider now the general case when (2.1) is not assumed. Set k, = h + l/n, 
and denote by Vz’, Vi, the extended upper and lower values when h is 
replaced by h, . Denote by Pn the payoff (1.6) when h is replaced by h, . 
Then, as n -+ co, 
P”(d) + P(d) 
uniformly with respect to x‘ E Xt,,T, . It follows that 
V&-j v&z, v&a -+ vi- as n--+co. 
Since the conditions (Ar)-(AJ and (2.1) are satisfied for each pair (f, h,), 
we conclude that Vz, = V;, . It follows that V,+ = V,-. This completes 
the proof of Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2. In [2], Lemma 2.1 was used to prove the existence 
of the extended value W, [under the conditions (Ai)- and (i), (ii)]. 
If one replaces Lemma 2.1 by Lemma 2.6, then one can deduce the existence 
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of IV, under the conditions (Ai)- only. Finally, if (2.1) holds then the 
relation (2.14) holds also for the extended value IV, [2], so that I’, = IV, 
[when (AI)- hold]. By approximating h by h + l/n we can deduce that 
V, = IV, also when the condition (2.1) is omitted. 
Remark. In the definition of Ve+, V,- we take P,[A, Tj where A, I’ are 
strategies based on a sequence of partitions II, of [to , TO] into n intervals of 
equal length. If we take another sequence of partitions IlW, with mesh 
converging to 0, then we obtain another pair of numbers, say Vza, V,T~. 
The proof of Theorem 1, however, remains unchanged. In particular, if 
(AI)- and (2.1) hold then V& = V;, = E*. By approximation it 
follows that Vzn = V;, = V, if (Ai)- hold. 
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